What do financial markets reveal about global warming? Working paper series--09-13 by Du, Ding et al.
  
 
 
What Do Financial Markets Reveal 
about Global Warming? 
Working Paper Series—09-13 | April 2009 
 
  
 
Ding Du 
Northern Arizona University  
The W. A. Franke College of Business 
PO Box 15066 
Flagstaff, AZ 86011.5066 
ding.du@nau.edu 
 (928) 523-7274 
 
Ronald Balvers 
Division of Economics and Finance 
West Virginia University 
Morgantown, WV 26506 
rbalvers@wvu.edu 
 (304) 293-7880 
 
Xiaobing Zhao 
Northern Arizona University  
The W. A. Franke College of Business 
PO Box 15066 
Flagstaff, AZ 86011.5066 
Xiaobing.Zhao@nau.edu 
 (928) 523-7279 
 1 
 
What Do Financial Markets Reveal about Global Warming? 
 
1. Introduction 
Evidence in support of the notion of global warming is accumulating. In its most comprehensive 
and up-to-date scientific assessment of climate change, the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize recipient 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concludes that “Warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal” (IPCC, 2007, Working Group I Report Summary for Policymakers, p. 5).  
The majority of the research concerning the economic impact of global warming has emphasized 
the future effect on production or cash flows of an abrupt change in climate to occur sometime after the 
year 2050.1 Prominent examples are the work of Mendelsohn et al. (2000) and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) 
examining and aggregating the output losses by sector, and the work of Horowitz (2001) and Nordhaus 
(2006) identifying aggregate output losses with a reduced-form cross-sectional approach, occurring once 
temperatures increase by at least 2.5 to 3.0 degrees Celsius. The highest estimate of the adverse impact of 
a 3.0 degrees Celsius increase in temperature is a three percent permanent decrease in GDP.  
After evaluating various climate-change mitigation strategies, IPCC estimates that stabilizing 
CO2 concentrations and limiting the long-term temperature rise may result in a 0.12 percent reduction in 
the annual growth rate of global GDP. This estimate provides a threshold for climate-change mitigation 
policies: policies are worth considering only if the negative economic impact of global warming 
represents a greater cost than the 0.12 percent reduction in GDP growth or a present value loss of 4.56 
percent of wealth.2 Because the GDP losses due to global warming of up to three percent occur so far in 
the future, the present value of these losses is usually too small to justify aggressive mitigation policies. 
Tol (2008, p.5) concisely summarizes the state of research by stating “It is therefore no surprise that cost-
benefit analyses of climate change recommend only limited greenhouse gas emission reduction.”  
We take a different approach in this paper and focus on the economic impact of gradual 
temperature change. This is motivated by the recent findings of IPCC. IPCC (2007) points out that gradual 
global warming can increase the intensity and frequency of extreme events. With gradual climate change, 
IPCC projects that drought, heavy precipitation, heat waves, extreme sea levels, and intense tropical cyclone 
activity will likely increase (see also NACC, 2000 and Stern, 2007). Figure 1 illustrates the increasing 
prevalence of extreme weather events with a scatter graph of the annual temperature and the climate 
extreme index (CEI) from the National Climatic Data Center in the U.S. over the 1946 to 2007 period.3 
                                                 
1 The direct impact on production of a rise in mean temperature staying within 2.5 degrees Celsius is usually small 
and even positive. See Tol (2008) for an excellent review.  
2 See Section 6 below for details. 
3 The CEI was first introduced in early 1996 with the goal of summarizing and presenting a complex set of 
multivariate and multidimensional climate changes in the United States. It is based on an aggregate set of 
conventional climate extreme indicators which, at the present time, include the following types of data: monthly 
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Figure 1.  Temperatures and Extreme Weather Events. 
 
 
Figure 1.  For each of the years over the 1946 to 2007 period (represented by the square dots), 
Figure 1 illustrates the prevalence of extreme weather in relation to the annual temperature average 
for the year (in degrees Fahrenheit). The extreme weather prevalence is measured by the Climate 
Extreme Index (CEI) from the National Climatic Data Center in the U.S. The CEI was introduced in 
early 1996 and is based on an aggregate set of conventional extreme-climate indicators which, at the 
present time, include the following types of data: monthly maximum and minimum temperature, 
daily precipitation, monthly Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI), and landfalling tropical storm 
and hurricane wind velocity. 
 
Extreme weather events typically adversely affect production and cash flows of firms. Stern 
(2007) points out that extreme events (such as storms, floods, droughts, and heat waves) could lead to 
significant infrastructure damage and faster capital depreciation, and that increases in extreme events will 
be particularly costly for developed economies because they invest a considerable amount in fixed capital 
each year (a good example is Hurricane Katrina).4 Stern (2007) estimates that the annual losses due to 
                                                                                                                                                             
maximum and minimum temperature, daily precipitation, the monthly Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI), and 
land-falling tropical storm and hurricane wind velocity. Each indicator has been selected based on its reliability, 
length of record, availability, and its relevance to changes in climate extremes. 
4 The 6/30/08 (pre-hurricane-Ike) issue of the Wall Street Journal reports that “Bad weather has cost U.S. property 
insurers more than $5 billion so far in second-quarter catastrophe-related claims—equal to about three-quarters of all 
catastrophe claims during 2007—and could push the industry to an underwriting loss.” 
 3 
 
extreme weather events have been around 0.2 percent of World GDP since the 1990s, and that the annual 
losses could reach 0.5 – 1.0 percent of world GDP by the middle of the century.5  
It is well known that impacts of global warming on cash flows could also be highly uncertain, 
which partly stems from considerable uncertainty about the magnitude of global warming, with the range 
of possible magnitudes involving differences of several hundred percent. This is illustrated by the IPCC’s 
widely-quoted estimates for the possible increase in global mean temperature. Its best estimate for global 
average surface warming at the end of the 21st century ranges from 1.8°C (with 66 percent confidence 
interval from 1.1°C to 2.9°C) to 4.0°C (with 66 percent confidence interval from 2.4°C to 6.4°C). Heal 
and Kriström (2002) argue that uncertainty is a central feature of climate change.  
In brief, global warming (negatively) affects cash flows of firms in an uncertain fashion, acting as 
a (negative) supply shock. This shock should affect firms and economy not only by its impact on the level 
of cash flows, but also by its impact on the risk or uncertainty of cash flows and therefore the cost of 
capital. Global warming (as a supply shock) introduces a new risk factor into the economy. As a result, 
investors demand higher returns on risky assets such as stocks and corporate bonds. Higher returns 
represent a higher cost of capital to firms, which can have a profound and adverse impact on capital 
investment and economic growth. The negative link between the cost of capital and economic growth is 
well documented in the economics literature (see for instance Henry, 2003). Thus, ignoring global 
warming’s impact on the cost of capital may significantly understate its economic impact. Yet a review of 
the literature shows that there has been no research concerning the impact of global warming on the cost 
of capital.6 We explore here in detail the cost-of-capital link. 
A related objective is to provide a detached assessment of possible costs of global warming: Since 
the scientific literature is not definitive concerning the magnitude of the welfare effects of global warming, 
the observable financial market impact of changes in the likelihood of global warming may provide an 
objective measure of the collective perception of some of the economic damages from global warming. 
If global warming is economically important, the risk premium and loadings associated with the 
global-warming factor should be significantly different from zero. In particular, if climate-change impacts 
are generally adverse (losses due to extreme events and/or adjustment costs), we expect to see a negative 
premium, because (1) if climate-change impacts are adverse, increases in temperature should lead to 
                                                 
5 Aside from extreme events, Quiggin and Horowitz (2003) emphasize adjustment costs to climate change. They 
argue that costs of adjustment will arise if capital stocks: (i) are dependent on climate for their optimal location; and 
(ii) depreciate more slowly than is required to permit easy adjustment to a changing climate. See also Nordhaus 
(1991), Cline (1992), Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994), Fankhauser (1995), Tol (1995), Rosenthal, 
Gruenspecht, and Moran (1995), Moore (1998), Mendelsohn and Neumann (1999), Schlenker, Hanemann, and 
Fisher (2006), and IPCC (2007) for the various impact mechanisms of global warming,    
6 Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2003) examine how temperature affects human mood and investor behavior, but not 
from the climate change perspective. Fankhauser and Tol (2005) study the impact of global warming on capital 
accumulation, but not from the cost of capital perspective. 
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lower returns for typical firms, and so the loadings on the global-warming factor should be generally 
negative; (2) to compensate for the additional risk, the equilibrium return should be higher, and with 
negative loadings this can only be achieved by a negative risk premium. In essence we conjecture that 
global warming is a risk factor that is priced because it affects investment opportunities in the sense of 
Merton (1973).  
We employ two approaches to estimate the posited risk premium of a global warming factor. The 
first is the tracking portfolio approach of Lamont (2001). The advantage of this approach is that it does 
not force us to select an equilibrium asset pricing model and therefore may avoid model specification 
error. But this approach cannot provide us with an estimate of the loadings on a global warming factor 
and the impact on the cost of capital. We therefore also employ a second, more structural approach – the 
two-pass regression methodology proposed by Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth 
(1973), as amended by Shanken (1992), Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken (2009), and Shanken and Zhou 
(2007). Consistent with our conjecture, we find evidence suggesting that signals of global warming cause 
an increase in the cost of capital. Quantitatively this evidence suggests that the impact of global warming 
may be larger than previously thought. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
perspective and states three testable hypotheses as well as presenting the appropriate expression for 
calculating the welfare loss. Section 3 briefly discusses the data. Section 4 presents a non-structural 
approach – the tracking portfolio approach – that does not involve specification of a particular asset 
pricing model and allows us to test two of the hypotheses, while Section 5 tests a third hypothesis and 
provides quantitative results in a structural context – applying the two-pass regression methodology to the 
standard Fama-French and CAPM asset pricing models. Section 6 investigates specifically the 
quantitative impact of climate change on the cost of capital, and Section 7 concludes the paper with a 
brief summary. 
 
2.  Theoretical Perspective and Hypotheses 
 A general perspective on the factors explaining asset returns is provided by the Merton (1973) 
model.  Merton’s model implies that excess returns are determined by the systematic risk of an asset, 
which in turn depends on the asset’s sensitivity to both market returns and aggregate changes in 
investment opportunities. The application of the model is not straightforward because it provides no 
specifics about how to characterize aggregate changes in investment opportunities. Of the two most 
popular asset pricing models, the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM ignores the possibility of investment opportunity 
shifts, and the Fama-French Three-Factor model empirically captures investment opportunity shifts by 
means of a value and a size factor. 
 5 
 
 In a steady state, climate cannot be considered a determinant of changes in investment 
opportunities. Particular weather realizations affect asset return realizations through standard channels but 
do not affect future investment opportunities.  The nature of a transition period between climate states 
arising on account of global warming, however, is that potential changes in climate are both uncertain and 
persistent.  Since climate strongly affects production and investment opportunities (see for instance 
Choinière and Horowitz, 2006), the climate changes associated with global warming would be key 
determinants of fluctuations in investment opportunities, and should be priced in the context of the 
Merton model. 
 We postulate that climate changes represent a priced Merton factor and check empirically if the 
implications of this view are confirmed by the data. The following hypotheses derive more or less directly 
from this postulate and will be the target of our empirical analysis in following sections. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1.  The global warming factor has a significant and negative risk premium. 
 
If the risk factor is priced, it should have a statistically and economically significant risk premium.  
Moreover, since the presumption is that most firms are negatively affected by increased warming (the 
factor loadings on the global warming factor are generally negative), the risk premium must be negative 
to ensure that riskier assets have higher average returns – a decrease in future investment opportunities is 
added on top of the initial negative weather shock; and firms whose investment opportunities are affected 
more are accordingly riskier. 
 The awareness of the possibility of global warming has increased over the last several decades 
and this can be taken to imply that changes in weather patterns may be increasingly thought as 
attributable to global warming and thus more persistent, implying a larger risk premium. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2.  The risk premium on the global warming factor increases (in absolute 
terms) over the global warming period starting in 1976. 
 
We here take as the start of global warming the year 1976 as claimed by IPCC (2007).  
One issue with global warming, potentially contributing to its surrounding controversy, is that it may 
have an uneven impact.  In particular, some industries (see IPCC, 2007 and Quiggin and Horowitz, 2003) 
are more vulnerable: agriculture and forestry, transportation, retail, commercial services, tourism, 
insurance, those industries dependent on climate-sensitive inputs (such as food processing), and 
industries with long-lived capital assets. If global warming is truly a risk factor, the industries that are 
 6 
 
more sensitive to climate changes should have higher loadings on the global warming factor and, 
accordingly, higher required returns. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3.  The industries that are considered to be more vulnerable to global warming 
have higher loadings on the global warming factor. 
 
To address these hypotheses with some accuracy we ask a rather narrower question than the 
question of whether global warming affects cost of capital.  For reasons of implementation we ask:  How 
does news about changes in average U.S. temperatures over the period classified by IPCC as the “global 
warming period” affect the cost of capital for U.S. equities?  Our belief is that by focusing on a case for 
which we have accurate data and a clearly defined set of questions, we can begin to obtain insights and 
ideas that are more generally applicable to the global case.  
As an implication, contingent on confirmation of the above hypotheses, we can formulate a 
measure for the losses stemming from gradual climate change’s effect on the cost of equity capital.  
 
PROPOSITION.  (A)  The aggregate change in the cost of equity capital due to the global 
warming factor equals the value-weighted average global warming beta times the global 
warming risk premium.  (B) The aggregate losses in average shareholder value can be 
approximated by the average change in the cost of equity capital times the average price-
dividend ratio. 
 
Part (B) of the proposition follows from a Gordon growth model approximation for equity value and by 
differentiating with respect to the cost of capital. 
  
3.  Data 
IPCC (2007) points out that global warming seems to have been taking place in two distinct 
phases, the first between 1910 and 1945, and the second from 1976. The decrease in the global 
temperature between 1945 and 1976 may be due to substantial sulphur emissions and changed sunspot 
activity in this period. Therefore, the post-WWII period offers two distinct periods to examine, the pre-
warming of 1946 to 1975 and the global warming of 1976 to 2008. We omit the pre-1946 period, 
avoiding the Great Depression and world war periods, to obtain more reliable estimates of the risk 
premium of global warming. 
In terms of location, we limit ourselves to the United States. Whereas global warming is by 
definition a world-wide phenomenon, there are complicated distribution issues that we are not prepared to 
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address. Additionally, the required weather and financial-market data are available for the U.S. and are 
uniformly accurate – in particular, climate measures, macro and risk factor data, and industry-specific 
equity portfolio returns. The portfolio returns and Fama-French factor data are from Kenneth French’s 
website.7 The macro variables data are from the Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis. The temperature time 
series is the U.S. average temperature series obtained from the National Climatic Data Center.  
 
4.  Economic Tracking Portfolios: A Non-Structural Approach 
Asset returns are driven by changing information, “news”, about future cash flows and discount 
rates. What matters for our purposes is the news concerning future global warming contained in the 
current observation. We could use a structural model to estimate the news concerning future global 
warming. But doing so results in a joint test of the validity of the model for what constitutes news and the 
validity of our hypothesis that global warming matters for financial markets. To circumvent this issue, we 
use the economic tracking portfolio approach proposed by Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989) 
and Lamont (2001), and recently applied by Vassalou (2003). Importantly, this a-theoretical approach 
further allows us to estimate the risk premium of global warming without imposing a particular model of 
asset pricing.  
 
4.1. A Statistical Model of Climate News  
For measurement purposes we equate climate change and global warming with a change in 
average temperatures. The extant temperature modeling literature (see IPCC, 2007) often uses structural 
atmospheric models. As Campbell and Diebold (2005) point out, however, although such an approach 
may be best for modeling and forecasting for a short horizon, it is not at all obvious that it is best for 
longer horizons. Successful modeling and forecasting does not necessarily require a structural model, and 
in the last several decades statisticians and econometricians have made great strides in the nonstructural 
modeling and forecasting of time series trend, seasonal, cyclical, and noise components.  
We therefore follow Campbell and Diebold (2005) and take a simple time-series approach to 
modeling and forecasting temperature. 8  Our time-series model is the daily temperature model of 
Campbell and Diebold (2005) amended to deal with monthly observations. We include a linear time trend 
and 11 monthly seasonal dummies for our monthly temperature data. That is, 
∑
=
+⋅+⋅+=
11
1i
tiitt errorseasonalStrendACT  ,                                                (1a)           
                                                 
7 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.  
8 See also Harvey (1989), Seater (1993), and Visser and Molenaar (1995). 
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with tT  representing the average temperature in month t, and errort representing the effects of all other 
variables. Defining ∑
=
++ =
12
1
12 12
1
i
itt TCT as the average temperature over the next year, we have 
1212 ++ +⋅+= ttt etrendacCT  ,                        (1b)   
where ∑∑
==
++=
11
1
12
1 12
1
12
1
i
i
i
SiACc , Aa = , and ∑
=
++ =
12
1
12 12
1
i
itt errore , captures the effects of all other 
variables  between t+1 and t+12.  Therefore, 
)()( 121121 +−+− +⋅+= ttttt eEtrendacCTE  .               (1c) 
Now define )()()( 1211212 +−++ −=Δ tttttt CTECTECTE as the news component in the temperature 
observation in month t. Then we have the tautology 
121212112 )()( +++−+ +Δ+≡ tttttt CTECTECT ω ,                                                             (2)   
which decomposes the annual temperature at the end of the following year in a previously expected 
component, a news component, and noise, with noise )( 121212 +++ −≡ tttt eEeω . 
 
4.2. An Economic Tracking Portfolio for Climate Change 
If global warming matters for asset pricing, innovations in excess returns of base assets reflect 
innovations in expectations about future global warming. That is, 
tttt RbCTE η+=Δ + ~)( 12  ,                                                                                             (3) 
where tR
~
represents a column vector of unexpected returns )(
~
1 tttt RERR −−= , with Rt a column vector 
of excess returns of base assets in month t, and tη the component of news that is orthogonal to the 
unexpected returns of the base assets.  
Assume that the base asset return in month t is a linear function of 1−tZ , a vector of conditioning 
economic variables known at period t-1, and that 12+te  is a linear function of 1−tZ , and 1' −tZ  a vector of 
conditioning climate variables known at period t-1. That is, 11 )( −− ⋅= ttt ZdRE  
and 11121 ')( −−+− ⋅+⋅= tttt ZgZfeE . Then we have from equations (1b), (2), and (3) that 
 121212112 )()( +++−+ +Δ+= tttttt CTECTECT ω  
12111 )(' +−−− ++−+++⋅+= ttttttt dZRbgZZftrendac ωη , 
or 
 121112 ' +−−+ ++++⋅+= tttttt eZbRgZtrendacCT ε   ,                          (4) 
 9 
 
with  e = - bd + f,  and 1212 ++ += ttt ωηε .  
Tracking portfolio returns are defined here as the “factor mimicking” portfolios of excess returns 
tt bRr = . The OLS regression given by equation (4) can be used to estimate the portfolio weights b so as to 
obtain tbR , the tracking portfolio returns of expectations about global warming, the global warming factor.  
The unconditional mean of the tracking portfolio returns )( tRbE represents the risk premium of 
the global warming factor (see Lamont, 2001 and Vassalou, 2003). The intuition is that the estimated 
coefficients b represent the base asset loadings on the temperature news. The portfolio with weights b on 
the base assets has a mean excess return )( tRbE  that reflects the risk due to temperature news and can be 
interpreted as the risk premium on the global warming factor. If global warming is economically 
important, the risk premium associated with global warming should be significantly different from zero. 
Furthermore, if climate-change impacts are generally adverse (losses due to extreme events and/or higher 
adjustment costs), we expect to see a negative premium: because the loadings on the global-warming 
factor should be normally negative and to compensate for the additional risk the equilibrium return should 
be higher, which, with negative loadings, can only be achieved by a negative risk premium. 
We focus on news concerning next year’s cumulative average temperatures ( 12+tCT ). The 
implicit assumption is that asset returns are affected by news regarding global warming over the 
upcoming one-year period. This is a reasonable simplifying assumption because, even if asset returns are 
affected by global warming news over a longer horizon, we would expect that much of this news pertains 
also to next year’s global warming. We largely follow Vassalou (2003) and use the six Fama-French 
size/book-to-market portfolios as the base assets.9 To obtain the conditioning variables – the 1−tZ in 
equation (4) – we again follow Vassalou (2003) and use macro variables which are known to predict 
equity returns. They are the risk-free rate (RF), the term premium (TERM), the default premium (DEF), 
and a detrended wealth variable (CAY) computed by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). We use the lagged 
average temperature over the past one year as the single climate control variable in 1' −tZ .  
 
                                                 
9 Although Vassalou (2003) also includes the term premium and the default premium as her base assets in R, we do 
not do so for two reasons. First, with our monthly data we find strong first-order autocorrelation in these two time 
series. As a result, including them as base assets introduces strong multicollinearity into Eq. (4). Note that the one-
month lagged term and default premium are used as the conditioning variables in Z. The resulting tracking portfolio 
is dominated by time-series variation in the default premium, and has little value for tracking the variation in 
temperature. The results are available upon request. Second, in theory, we want to extract the news about future 
global warming that the stock market perceives and then estimate the risk premium on stocks. Therefore, the bond 
portfolio returns are not necessary as base assets. They are still useful as conditioning variables because the 
literature shows that they can predict equity returns (see Fama and French, 1988).      
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4.3. The Trend in Temperature   
One potential misspecification of the model in equation (1a) is that the temperature series may 
have a stochastic trend instead of a deterministic trend. We therefore conduct a unit root test. IPCC (2007) 
indicates that global warming is a post-1976 phenomenon. Therefore, if there is a deterministic trend in 
temperature, it should be a broken trend. This observation motivates us to consider an econometric 
procedure developed by Perron (1997), which tests a stochastic trend against a broken deterministic trend. 
Under the specific model we consider, a change in the slope is allowed and both segments of the 
trend function are joined at the time of the break. Following Perron (1997), we employ a two-step 
procedure. First, the temperature series is detrended using the following regression, 
tttt TDTtrendT +⋅+⋅+= *δβμ  ,                                                                        (5) 
where TBtrendDT tt −=*  if  ,TBtrendt > and 0 otherwise, with TB  the (unknown) time at 
which the break in the trend occurs; tT is the detrended temperature series. The test is performed on 
tT using the t-statistic for 1=α in the following regression: 
 t
k
i
ititt eTcTT +Δ+= ∑
=
−−
1
1α  .                                                                                 (6) 
In these regressions, TB  and the truncation lag parameter k are treated as unknown. TB  is selected as the 
value which minimizes the t-statistic for testing 1=α : αˆt . The asymptotic critical values of αˆt  under the 
null (unit-root) hypothesis are provided by Perron (1997).  K is obtained from the t-sig procedure which 
selects the value of k (say k*) such that the coefficient on the last lag in an autoregression of order k* is 
significant and that the last coefficient in an autoregression of order greater than k* is insignificant, up to 
a predetermined maximum (here we choose 24 months as the maximum lag).  
The estimation results are reported in Table 1. The data-dependent procedure chooses TB  to be 
December 1976, and k to be 22. With these values, αˆt  is minimized.  Its value of -5.55 is significant at the 
1% level and implies rejection of the unit-root hypothesis for the temperature series. Therefore, the 
specification assumed in equation (1a) is considered to be appropriate. To be consistent with the general 
literature (i.e. IPCC, 2007), we use January 1976 as our break point.  
 
  Table 1.  Broken Trend in the Temperature Series:  1946:1-2008:6 
Results for the Perron test to find the break point of a time series trend. The temperature series tT  
is detrended using tttt TDTtrendT +⋅+⋅+= *δβμ  , where TBtrendDT tt −=*  if  ,TBtrendt > and 0 
otherwise; TB  is the (unknown) time at which the break in the trend occurs;  tT  is the detrended 
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temperature series. The test is performed on tT using the t-statistic αˆt  for 1=α in: 
t
k
i
ititt eTcTT +Δ+= ∑
=
−−
1
1α
; k is the number of lags of the detrended temperature. TB  is selected as 
the value which minimizes αˆt . The asymptotic critical values of αˆt  under the null (unit-root) 
hypothesis listed here are from Perron (1997).  k is selected by the t-sig procedure which selects 
the value of k (say k*) such that the coefficient on the last lag in an autoregression of order k* is 
significant and that the last coefficient in an autoregression of order greater than k* is insignificant, 
up to a predetermined maximum (we select 24 months as the maximum lag).  
 
TB  k αˆt  
1976:9 22 -5.55  
 
Critical Values for αˆt  
 1% 5% 10% 
For 200 obs. -5.28 -4.65 -4.38 
infinite sample -4.91 -4.36 -4.07 
    
αˆ  μˆ  βˆ δˆ  
0.025 52.863 -0.001 0.006 
 
4.4. Empirical Results 
Table 2 presents the construction and diagnostic tests of the global warming factor mimicking 
tracking portfolios based on equation (4) with the six Fama-French size-BM portfolios as the base assets 
and the macro variables used also by Vassalou (2003) as conditioning variables. The t-ratios are based on 
Newey-West HAC standard errors with the lag parameter set equal to 12.  
 
Table 2.  Tracking Portfolios and Diagnostic Tests 
The results for the regression of eq. (4), 121112 ' +−−+ ++++⋅+= tttttt eZbRgZtrendacCT ε , are in 
Panel A, where CTt+12 represents the average annual temperature, Rt = (SLt, SMt, SHt, BLt, BMt, 
BHt)’  represents the excess returns of the Fama-French size-BM portfolios defined in Table 1.  Zt-
1 = (RFt, DEFt-1-,TERMt-1 CAYt-1)’, which are, respectively, the risk free rate, the lagged default 
risk premium, the lagged term premium, and the lagged Cay factor from Lettau and Ludvigson. 
Z’t-1 is our lagged climate gauge.  Panel B provides the R-square of the regression in eq. (7), 
121112112 )]|([)( +−+−+ +−=− ttttttt uZbREbRcCTECT , forecasting the temperature news based on the 
coefficient on Rt from Panel A.  Panel C presents the average return on portfolio Rt with the 
weights given by the coefficient estimates in Panel A. 
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 1976:1-2007:6 1946:1-1975:12 
 
Panel A.  Tracking Portfolio Regressions 
 
 Coeff t-ratio Coeff t-ratio 
     
SLt 0.033 2.24 0.015 0.97 
SMt 0.018 0.49 -0.046 -1.81 
SHt -0.080 -2.70 -0.008 -0.37 
BLt 0.011 0.54 -0.001 -0.05 
BMt -0.019 -0.84 0.014 0.87 
BHt 0.025 1.24 0.018 1.18 
     
Constant 55.008 9.75 58.613 8.68 
Trend 0.006 4.75 -0.004 -1.58 
CTt-12 -0.121 -1.08 -0.087 -0.65 
RFt 1.131 1.88 0.606 0.78 
DEFt-1 0.528 1.74 0.654 2.70 
TERMt-1 -0.150 -2.21 -0.080 -0.54 
CAYt-1 -4.620 -0.55 -9.403 -1.32 
     
Adj-R2 0.49  0.18  
χ2 p-value 0.00  0.01  
 
Panel B.  Lower Bounds of Tracking Portfolio Explanatory Power 
 
Lower Bound 0.049  0.038  
 
Panel C.  The means of the Tracking Portfolio Returns 
 
Mean -0.047 -4.15 -0.006 -1.22 
 
The columns labeled “1976:1-2007:6” represent the results for the IPCC global warming period. 
The coefficient estimates in Panel A indicate that SL and SH have significant tracking ability for future 
global warming. This seems to be reasonable because small companies are generally more sensitive to 
global warming or any other risk. Growth firms may potentially benefit from global warming as they do 
not have their capital in place yet (SL coefficient > 0). Value firms face adjustment costs, as argued by 
Quiggin and Horowitz (2003), since their capital is already in place (SH coefficient < 0). In the next panel, 
the chi-square test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients on the base assets are jointly zero at the 0% 
level, indicating that the base assets have significant tracking ability.  
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We next evaluate the ability of the tracking portfolio to forecast temperature changes for the 
upcoming year, with the following regression suggested by Lamont (2001): 
12112112 )]|([)( +−+−+ +−⋅=− ttttttt uZbREbRhCTECT                                           (7)   
The R-square from this regression provides an indication of the tracking ability of the factor mimicking 
portfolio. It gives a lower bound for the tracking ability because, from equation (2), the left-hand side of 
equation (7) is only a noisy measure of the news component in the recent temperature observation. The R-
square in Panel B is 4.9% for the global warming period. So it appears that our tracking portfolio has 
significant ability for tracking global warming news. In comparison, the ability of the tracking portfolios 
to track news related to future GDP growth in Vassalou (2003) varies between 3% and 8%. Panel C 
provides the mean of the tracking portfolio return, which is -0.047 percent with t-statistic of -4.15 for the 
1976:1-2007:6 period. Therefore, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the risk premium on global warming is 
significantly negative. Figure 2 shows raw average temperatures and the global warming factor series for 
1976 to 2007.10  
 
Figure 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Temperatures and the Global Warming Factor. 
Figure 2a.  Annual Average Raw Temperatures, 12+tCT  
1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
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52.0
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53.5
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54.5
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55.5
 
                                                 
10  The results are robust to the somewhat arbitrary choice of conditioning variables. The results presented are for the 
conditioning variables used in Vassalou (2003).  However, the global warming risk premium estimate is nearly 
identical if we use lagged values of the test assets as conditioning variables, or even if we drop the conditioning 
variables altogether.  These results are available from the authors. 
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Figure 2b.  Global Warming Tracking Portfolio Returns, tbR  
1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
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Figure 2. The average raw temperatures over the next one year, 
12/)(
12
1
12 ∑
=
++ =
i
itt TCT
, are shown in 
Figure 2a in degrees Fahrenheit for t = 1976:1 to 2007:6. Figure 2b displays the global-warming 
factor series, the global-warming factor mimicking portfolio returns, for the global-warming 
period 1976:1 to 2007:6.  
 
If global warming does not occur in the period before 1976, temperatures for this period ought to 
be irrelevant to asset pricing – mean asset returns are not driven by temperature news – and the tracking 
portfolio will have little power to predict future temperature. To test this conjecture, we repeat the above 
exercise for the IPCC pre-warming period of 1946 to 1975. The results are reported in Table 2 in the 
columns labeled “1946:1-1975:12”. The tracking portfolio for this period has some ability to track future 
temperature (but significantly less than for the global warming period).  However, the risk premium for 
this period is an insignificant -0.006 percent as anticipated. 
 
4.5 Time Path of the Risk Premium 
To obtain more information about the path of the global warming risk premium over time, we 
repeat the above exercise with a rolling sample. The risk premium at each time is estimated with 10 years 
of data to obtain meaningful estimates. Consequently the test period starts in 1956. We update estimates 
monthly by dropping the earliest observation and adding the latest observation. The results are displayed 
in Figure 3. The evidence further confirms that global warming matters for asset pricing and that its risk 
premium is significantly negative and apparently growing over time as is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 
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2.  Interestingly, the risk premium estimate shows more variability from the 1990-s onward which may 
reflect swings in perceptions, as the debate concerning global warming became increasingly polarized. 
 
Figure 3.  Time Path of the Global Warming Risk Premium – Rolling Estimates 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
-0.100
-0.075
-0.050
-0.025
-0.000
0.025
0.050
 
Figure 3.  The risk premium is estimated for the entire 1946-2007 sample using 10 years of data 
for each estimate. Thus, the first period starts in 1956. We update the estimates each month by 
dropping the earliest observation and adding the latest observation. 
 
5.  Standard Asset Pricing Models: A Structural Approach 
The tracking portfolio approach of Lamont (2001) in Section 4 estimates the risk premium of the 
global warming factor without specifying an equilibrium asset pricing model. In this section, we 
supplement these results by estimating the risk premium of global warming within a multi-factor model. 
This approach enables us to obtain the sensitivities to the global warming factor of particular industries, to 
address Hypothesis 3 and to estimate the quantitative impact of global warming on the cost of equity. 
 
5.1. The Empirical Model 
For our asset pricing specifications we take the Fama-French (1996) three-factor model and the 
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. These are the most common systematic risk models. Both can be viewed as 
special cases of the Merton (1973) model.  The global warming factor is added to these specifications as 
an additional factor (the only such factor in the CAPM case) affecting investment opportunities over time. 
If climate-change impacts are adverse we expect to find negative loadings for typical firms or 
portfolios and a negative risk premium (to compensate for the additional risk the equilibrium return 
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should be higher; with negative loadings this can only be achieved with a negative risk premium). The 
impact of global warming on the average cost of capital can naturally be measured by the product of the 
premium and the average loading of assets on the global-warming factor.  
We use the Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-pass 
methodology – estimating factor sensitivities in the first pass, and using these to obtain risk premia in the 
second pass – with standard refinements: the Shanken (1992) correction to obtain errors-in-variables-
robust standard errors, accounting for the fact that factor sensitivities are estimated, and the Shanken and 
Zhou (2007) correction to generate misspecification-robust standard errors.11  
Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken (2009) argue that using as test assets only size–BM portfolios, as is 
common in the literature, can be highly misleading due to the strong factor structure of these portfolios. 
They propose to expand the set of test assets to include other portfolios, such as industry portfolios. 
Including industry portfolios also is particularly attractive for our research since the global warming 
literature has predictions for how different industries should be affected. Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken 
(2009) further argue that researchers take the predicted magnitudes of the slopes seriously, since the 
problems are exacerbated by the fact that empirical tests often ignore restrictions on the cross-sectional 
slopes. For example, the risk premium on a factor portfolio should be close to its average excess return.  
We take their advice and use 55 size-BM and industry portfolios (25 size-BM portfolios and 30 
industry portfolios) instead of just 25 size-BM portfolios, and force the premium on the Fama-French 
factors equal to their average excess returns as the risk adjustment in the second pass. That is, we employ 
the following CSR model 
iGWiGWHMLHMLiSMBSMBiMMii errrr ++=++− ,0,,, ˆ)ˆˆˆ( βγγβββ                                   (8)   
where the βˆ s are the factor loadings (jointly estimated for the four factors) from the first-pass time series 
regression, ir is the mean excess return of asset I, and Mr , SMBr and HMLr are the mean excess returns of 
the Fama-French factors. We use the economic tracking portfolio for global warming as the global-
warming factor. 
 
5.2. Empirical Results 
Since global warming represents a new systematic risk, adversely affecting investment 
opportunities in the economy, we expect to see that the global-warming factor is priced and that its 
premium is negative in the 1976 to 2007 period. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. The 
intercept in equation (8), γ
0
, is not significant suggesting no model misspecification. More interestingly, 
                                                 
11 See also Kim (1995) and Jagannathan and Wang (1998). 
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we see that the global-warming factor indeed is priced. The premium associated with this factor, GWγ , is -
0.029 percent per month with an EIV-robust t-statistic of -2.86 and a misspecification-robust-statistic of -
2.78, again confirming Hypothesis 1. The premium estimate is in the ballpark of its mean value reported 
in Table 3 which is -0.049.  
 
Table 3.  Risk Premium of the Global Warming Factor for Risk-Adjusted Returns: 1976:1-2007:6 
Panel A.  The risk premium on the GW factor for the sample period 1976-2007 is GW
γ
, obtained 
from iGWiGWHMLHMLiSMBSMBiMMii
errrr ++=++− ,0,,, ˆ)ˆˆˆ( βγγβββ , where  ir is the mean 
excess return of asset i, the βˆ s are the estimated factor loadings from the first-pass time-series 
regressions, and Mr , SMBr and HMLr are the mean excess returns of the Fama-French factors.  
Panel B.  The risk premium on the GW factor for the sample period 1976-2007 is GW
γ
, obtained 
from iGWiGWMMii
err ++=− ,0, ˆ)ˆ( βγγβ , where  ir is the mean excess return of asset i, 
the βˆ s are the estimated factor loadings from the first-pass time-series regressions, and Mr is the 
mean market excess return.  
 
Errors-in-variables (EIV) robust standard errors are based on Shanken (1992), and 
misspecification (MS) robust standard errors are based on Shanken and Zhou (2007). 
 
 Coefficient EIV-robust t-ratio MS-robust t-ratio
 
Panel A.  Fama-French Risk Adjustment, 1976:1-2007:6 
γ0 -0.038 -0.56  -0.56  
γGW -0.029 -2.86  -2.78  
 
Panel B.  CAPM Risk Adjustment, 1976:1-2007:6 
γ0 0.120  0.94  0.93  
γGW -0.024  -2.30  -2.25  
 
We also consider an alternative asset pricing model – the classic CAPM. We impose the 
restriction on the premium of the market factor. Therefore, the CSR model is: 
iGWiGWMMii err ++=− ,0, ˆˆ βγγβ                                                                            (9)        
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 3. The premium is negative and significant, confirming 
Hypothesis 1, though at -0.024 a bit smaller in absolute value than for the Fama-French model.  
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5.3. Time Path of the Risk Premium 
To obtain more information about the path of the global warming risk premium over time, we 
repeat the above exercise with a rolling sample as we did for the tracking portfolio approach. The risk 
premium at each time is estimated with 10 years of data to obtain meaningful estimates. Consequently the 
test period starts in 1956. We update estimates monthly by dropping the earliest observation and adding 
the latest observation. The results are displayed in Figure 4. The evidence further confirms that global 
warming matters for asset pricing and that its risk premium is significantly negative and apparently 
growing over time as is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2.  Again, the risk premium estimate shows 
more variability from the 1990s onward which may reflect swings in perceptions. 
 
Figure 4.  Rolling Estimates of the Global-Warming Factor Risk Premium.   
 
Panel A.  Two-Pass FF 
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Panel B.  Two-Pass CAPM 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
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Figure 4.  The risk premium is estimated for the entire 1946-2007 sample using 10 years of data 
for each estimate. Accordingly, the first period starts in 1956. We update the estimates each month 
by dropping the earliest observation and adding the latest observation. 
  
6. Global Warming and the Cost of Capital   
6.1. Estimation 
To estimate the impact of climate change on the cost of capital, we report the factor loadings in 
Table 4 for the 1976 to 2007 sample period. The significant factor loadings (at the 10% level for two-
sided tests) are in bold. We discuss the industry portfolio factor loadings to gauge the support for 
Hypothesis 3.  
 
Table 4.  Factor Loadings of the Industry Portfolios: 1976:1-2007:6 
The factor loadings of the industry portfolios over the sample period 1976-2006 are inferred from: 
ittGWitHMLitSMBitMiiit GWHMLSMBMr εββββα +++++= ,,,, , 
where it
r
 is the excess return on asset i in period t, tttt
GWHMLSMBM ,,,
 are the excess 
returns on the market, the size, the book-to-market, and the global warming factor. The β ’s are 
the associated factor loadings, and it
ε
 is the disturbance. To save space, we do not report the 
associated HAC-robust (Newey-West) t-statistics. The significant factor loadings (at the 10% 
level of significance are in bold. The average factor loading is the unweighted average for all 55 
portfolios in our tests.   
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Industry αi βi, M βi, SMB βi, HML βi, GW Adj-R2 
Food -0.09  0.71  0.47  0.19  -4.73  0.74  
Beer 0.23  0.79  0.24  0.27  -3.09  0.45  
Smoke 0.65  0.81  0.20  0.18  -3.05  0.19  
Games -0.36  0.97  0.88  0.24  -2.85  0.68  
Books -0.04  0.89  0.56  0.21  -3.12  0.76  
Hshld -0.35  0.90  0.68  0.16  -5.18  0.79  
Clths -0.41  0.92  0.69  0.21  -6.89  0.69  
Hlth 0.52  1.04  1.39  0.21  7.89  0.80  
Chems -0.09  1.01  0.51  0.41  -1.69  0.80  
Txtls -0.81  0.95  0.67  0.33  -7.62  0.58  
Cnstr -0.32  1.04  0.74  0.36  -5.59  0.79  
Steel -0.40  1.23  0.87  0.76  1.89  0.69  
FabPr -0.10  1.03  0.83  0.24  -1.47  0.83  
ElcEq -0.12  1.06  1.00  0.31  1.09  0.79  
Autos -0.60  1.07  0.66  0.36  -5.87  0.73  
Carry -0.01  1.03  0.56  0.26  -6.61  0.63  
Mines -0.13  0.92  1.08  1.02  8.68  0.28  
Coal -0.37  1.05  0.63  0.87  5.17  0.22  
Oil 0.02  1.04  0.61  0.69  2.51  0.35  
Util 0.20  0.66  0.10  0.77  3.97  0.56  
Telcm 0.45  1.17  1.03  0.19  8.51  0.70  
Servs 0.39  1.14  1.19  0.02  4.75  0.82  
BusEq 0.41  1.23  1.43  -0.03  5.17  0.83  
Paper -0.22  0.94  0.46  0.30  -3.52  0.80  
Trans -0.31  1.01  0.61  0.31  -4.17  0.76  
Whlsl -0.21  0.93  0.87  0.26  -2.03  0.80  
Rtail -0.21  0.97  0.62  0.04  -6.80  0.72  
Meals -0.50  0.85  0.73  0.21  -6.57  0.68  
Fin 0.09  0.78  0.39  0.32  -5.64  0.80  
Other -0.08  0.97  0.77  0.22  -2.33  0.77  
Average (equal) -0.09  0.97  0.72  0.33  -1.31  0.67  
Average (value) 0.08 0.97 0.76 0.27 -0.31 0.72 
 
The literature (see IPCC, 2007, Working Group II Report Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, 
Chapter 7, and Quiggin and Horowitz, 2003) suggests that the most vulnerable industries are Agriculture 
and Forestry, Transportation, Retail, Commercial Services, Tourism, Insurance, those industries 
dependent on climate-sensitive inputs (such as Food Processing), and industries with long-lived capital 
assets. The results in Table 7 seem generally consistent with this classification, confirming Hypothesis 3. 
In all, 14 out of 30 industry portfolios have statistically significant loadings on the global-warming factor, 
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even after we control for the effects of the Fama-French factors. They include Food, Meals, Finance, 
Transportation, Retail, and Construction.  
All of the significant loadings on the global-warming factor are negative except for the Utility, 
Telecommunications, and Health industries. The utility industry has a small demand elasticity, and 
therefore may provide a good hedge against negative supply shocks.  The telecommunications and health 
industries appear also to have small demand elasticities. The (equal-weighted) average loading on the GW 
factor is significant and equal to -1.31.  To obtain the average cost of equity capital, however, we 
calculate the value-weighted average loading by weighting each loading by the market value of the 
industry. The resulting weighted average cost of equity capital is a substantially smaller   -0.31. 
The global warming risk premium is -0.029% per month based on the two-pass regression for the 
Fama-French risk factors. Taken together with the value-weighted average GW loading of -0.31, the 
results reveal that the GW factor increases the average cost of capital by 0.009% per month or 0.11% per 
year. The question we address next is what this number implies about the cost of global warming and how 
it relates to previous studies providing global warming cost estimates. 
A convenient means of accounting for the costs of global warming is to use the Gordon growth 
model approximation arising when we equate asset prices with the expected net present value of future 
dividends, and proxy the latter by setting the dynamic paths of dividends, dividend growth, and costs of 
capital equal to their averages.  Aggregate stock market values can then be expressed as )/( GRDP −= , 
in which P is the current stock market price index, D the end-of-period expected dividends (considered a 
constant proportion of GDP), G the average anticipated growth rate of dividends, and R is the average 
cost of capital. 
 
6.2. Implications 
We can then draw the following conclusions based on the existing literature and our own results: 
(1) The estimated cost of global warming in terms of permanent future decreases in GDP, as 
emphasized by previous literature, vary from around 0.2% to 1.0% (Stern, 2007) and below 1% (IPCC, 
2007) to 2.0% to 3.5% per 1 degree Celsius increase in temperature (Choinière and Horowitz, 2006) and a 
maximum of 3.75% (Heal and Kriström, 2002).  Even though these estimates deal with permanent 
changes in GDP the present value of the cost, assuming that dividends remain a constant proportion of 
GDP and even if the changes occur without delay, is simply the equivalent percent change in stock market 
value: the Gordon growth equation implies that DP Δ=Δ %% . 
(2) Henry (2003) finds an approximate one-to-one relationship between the cost of capital 
and GDP growth.  This is consistent with the Gordon growth perspective in which the impact of a change 
in the cost of capital is equivalent to the impact of an opposite change in the growth rate of dividends or 
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output: GPRP ΔΔ−=ΔΔ /%/% .  Accordingly, the stock market wealth impact of our 0.11 percent 
increase in the cost of capital is equivalent to that of a 0.11 percent reduction in the growth rate of 
dividends or output.  Since the IPCC cost of limiting the long-term temperature rise is a 0.12 percent 
reduction in annual GDP growth, the impact of global warming on the cost of capital alone is of similar 
magnitude as the total policy cost, which allows room to contemplate more aggressive climate-change 
mitigation policies. 
(3) The Gordon growth approximation also implies that RDPP Δ−=Δ )/(% . If we set P/D 
(the price-dividend ratio) equal to 38, which is its average value over the global warming period, since 
1976 (see Robert Shiller’s website) then the present value of the cost of global warming is 38 x 0.11% = 
4.18%. This negative impact alone is close to the 4.56 percent cost of reducing global warming based on 
the IPCC estimate. 
 
6.3. Perspectives 
To put our estimate of a 4.18 percent loss due to global warming in the perspective of previous 
estimates, consider the following: 
First, the literature has considered mainly the specific present value costs of permanent future 
losses in GDP due to abrupt climate change, and, more recently, the costs of losses in GDP related to 
extreme weather due to gradual climate changes. However, the uncertainty about temperatures, extreme 
weather, and associated regulation adds substantially to the overall costs and shows up in the higher cost 
of capital which previous studies have ignored in this context. Thus our result amounts to adding an 
additional present value cost of global warming of larger magnitude to previously identified costs. 
Second, our estimate of a 4.18% loss presumes that the change in the cost of capital is permanent. 
Our rolling regression results for the risk premium shows how dangerous this assumption is – clearly the 
risk premium changes substantially over time. However, we have taken conservatively the average risk 
premium since the start of the global warming period, which Figures 3 and 4 show is smaller in absolute 
value than the risk premium has been over the last ten years. (Note, though, that the CAPM and the tracking 
portfolio results suggest a recent decline in the risk premium). While it is certainly possible that the cost of 
capital attributable to global warming may decrease again over time, it may also increase over time, and 
there is no reason to assume that uncertainty about climate change is diminishing in the near future. 
Third, an approximate confidence interval of two standard deviations around our monthly risk 
premium estimate would provide a range from 0.009% to 0.049% for the GW risk premium. At the lower 
bound the cost estimate would be an annualized 1.27%, at the upper bound an annualized 6.93%.  Thus, 
estimation uncertainty is substantial. 
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Fourth, it is not clear how representative the United States stock market values are of the world. 
Developed economies experience higher losses due to the adjustment costs of capital and so the costs for 
the United States may overestimate those for the world.  A further implicit assumption is that the stock 
market losses are representative for losses in the overall economy. It is possible for instance that certain 
sectors of the economy are over or under represented in the stock market or that there are distribution 
effects within a sector. For instance, farmers may suffer from global warming but this need not lower 
profit margins in the food industry. 
Fifth, our estimates do not take into consideration time variation in the average value-weighted 
loadings on the GW factor.  Industries with larger increases in the cost of capital may shrink over time as 
investment in these industry falls, causing the value-weighted loadings to move closer to zero. On the 
other hand, such reduction in investment lowers growth, an indirect effect that we have not yet 
incorporated in the cost calculation. 
 
6.4. Uncertainty about regulation 
One potential explanation for the sensitivity of particular industries to our global warming 
measure is that the global warming indicator has little intrinsic economic importance (either because it is 
a statistical illusion, has only minor economic impact, or is too remote to affect current present values) 
but that markets fear the political pressures arising from common perceptions of a global warming threat 
that may lead to untoward regulation hurting business profits.  This “untoward regulation” line of 
reasoning implies that those industries which are most vulnerable to regulation designed to reduce global 
warming would be the most sensitive to the global warming factor. A prospective regulatory impact 
generally entails rationing or taxation of carbon-dioxide emissions.  Hence the prediction is that industries 
that are the most sensitive to the global warming factor are those industries that have the highest share of 
carbon dioxide emissions.  
Schipper (2006, pp. 17-19) provides data on carbon-dioxide emissions in U.S. manufacturing. 
Manufacturing accounts for around 84 percent of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions. The Petroleum 
(Oil), Chemicals, and Primary Metals (mostly Steel) industries have the highest carbon dioxide emissions, 
together generating more than half of these emissions.  However, according to Table 4 these industries 
have either positive or insignificant sensitivities to the global warming factor. Furthermore, many of the 
industries in Table 4 with the most significant negative exposures to the global warming factor are non-
manufacturing industries such as Finance, Retail, and Meals, with obviously low carbon-dioxide 
emissions. These observations do not support the “untoward regulation” explanation. 
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7.  Conclusion 
The severity of impact and even the existence of global warming are heavily debated. On one end 
of the debate are the “environmentalists” who care deeply about the negative long-run impact of climate 
change and may be tempted to under appreciate the economic sacrifices required to combat global 
warming; on the other end are the “industrialists” who may be owners of capital and overly occupied with 
the costs necessary to implement policies of fighting global warming. The controversy makes it difficult 
to obtain an unbiased measure of even the perceived costs of global warming.  Financial markets may be 
helpful in uncovering true perceptions. When investing in financial assets, individuals – irrespective of 
their background or political convictions – have an incentive not to “put their money where their mouth 
is” but to put their money where their mind is.  Asset prices provide objective measures of perceived 
value.  We attempt to exploit the information embedded in asset price reactions to news about global 
warming to infer an objective measure of perceived costs of global warming. 
We focus on gradual temperature change, which is motivated by the recent emphasis of Stern (2007) 
and IPCC (2007) on the ongoing costs of extreme weather events that stem from gradual warming.12 Our 
approach ties into the gradual warming perspective and stresses the higher cost of capital that arises from 
uncertainty about the extent of gradual warming and the increasing prevalence of extreme weather events. 
The costs of global warming that we derive, therefore, are a complement to the costs found in the earlier 
work and should be added to previous cost estimates to obtain a more comprehensive cost total.  
While we may draw inferences about the broad question of what financial markets in general can 
tell us about global warming, we obtain a more reliable answer to a narrower question: how do U.S. 
equity markets react to news about average U.S. temperatures?  If we work in the context of (i) the 
Merton (1973) asset pricing model and (ii) presume that the IPCC (2007) is justified in marking the post-
1976 period as one of global warming, then we hypothesize that a significant risk premium exists on a 
global warming factor, which is rising in the post-1976 period, and that loadings at the industry level on 
this factor are generally negative and more so for industries that are considered to be more sensitive to 
global warming.  
We are able to confirm the hypotheses and infer, conservatively taking the average risk premium 
for the post-1976 period, that the average cost of capital is 0.11 percentage points higher on an annual 
basis due to global warming.  Thus, markets expect that due to the uncertainty, the costs of adjustment, 
and the increased incidence of extreme-weather events, each caused by global warming, potential projects 
will on average have a 0.11 percentage points lower return. The implied costs of global warming amount 
to a point estimate of a 4.18 percent loss in value – larger than, and adding to, most previous estimates. 
                                                 
12 In analogy to the terminology used in evoluationary biology distinguishing between the standard gradual 
Darwinian perspective and Gould’s punctuated equilibrium theory of abrupt evolutionary changes, we may refer to 
the distinction here as global warming by “creeps” and global warming by “jerks”. 
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